Δεν διατίθεται στα ελληνικά.
Adina-Elena Fudulache
Risk Management
- Division
Risk Strategy
- Current Position
-
Financial Risk Expert
- Fields of interest
-
Financial Economics,Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
- Education
- 2014
Master's degree, Financial Markets and Intermediaries, Toulouse School of Economics
- 2011
Bachelor's degree, Finance and Banking, Bucharest University of Economic Studies
- Professional experience
- 2023-2024
Senior Economist, Macro-financial Analysis and Monetary Policy Department, Banco de España
- 2016-2021
Research Analyst / Economist, Directorate General Market Operations, European Central Bank
- 2015-2016
Trainee, Directorate General Market Operations, European Central Bank
- 2014-2015
Trainee, Credit Rating Agencies Unit, European Securities and Markets Authority
- Awards
- 2014
Costin Murgescu Award for Economic Research, Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund (FGBD) Romania
- 7 November 2025
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 378Details
- Abstract
- In this paper we explore the role of the temporary and country-specific Additional Credit Claims (ACC) frameworks as a monetary policy implementation tool. We discuss their evolution and provide a novel and detailed description of all ACC measures adopted by the different euro area NCBs since 2012. Reviewing the literature, we document the channels through which ACCs contributed to liquidity distribution during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, the negative interest rate period and the pandemic. Drawing on panel data on the use of collateral and securities holding statistics, we document novel stylised facts about ACC mobilisation patterns during these episodes. A number of conceptual contributions and empirical findings emerge. While ACCs started out as a crisis instrument, the historical review highlights that ACCs constitute a policy tool that is suitable for enhancing monetary policy implementation. Empirically we find that pledging ACCs was not systematically associated with more concentrated collateral pools. Banks pledging ACCs were mostly universal banks and diversified lenders of varying size and were associated with higher funding costs for their short-term secured debt instruments, though the causality is unclear. Finally, drawing on the implementation and risk management experience with ACC frameworks as well as our empirical findings, we establish five lessons to inform future policy discussions on collateral
- JEL Code
- E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
E65 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
- 28 April 2022
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOXEconomic Bulletin Issue 3, 2022Details
- Abstract
- The gradual phasing-out of the pandemic collateral easing measures in three steps between July 2022 and March 2024 will restore the Eurosystem’s pre-pandemic risk tolerance in its collateral framework, while avoiding cliff effects in collateral availability. The collateral easing measures introduced in April 2020 facilitated banks’ access to Eurosystem credit operations by adding around €285 billion of collateral, playing an important role in supporting the provision of credit to the economy during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. The ECB will continue to waive the minimum credit quality requirement for Greek government bonds (GGBs), allowing national central banks (NCBs) to accept them as collateral at least as long as reinvestments in such bonds under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) continue.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E65 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
- 2023
- Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper
- 2014
- Revista OEconomica